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RECENT BOOKS 
BooK R.Evmws 
JUDICIAL R.Evmw IN THE CONTEMPORARY WoRLD. By Mauro Cap-
pelletti. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1971. Pp. xv, 117. $8.50. Stu-
dent edition $4.50. 
The period following World War II may well be recorded in 
history as one of the great epochs in the development of constitu-
tionalism and the rule of law. Three phenomena may be singled 
out as central to this development: (1) an extraordinary ferment 
and productivity in the drafting and adoption of new written con-
stitutions; (2) the recognition that a statement of fundamental rights 
is basic to the constitutional order; and (3) a growing acceptance 
of judicial review premised on the assumption that judicial control 
of the constitutional order is necessary in order to preserve the in-
tegrity of the order and assure protection of fundamental rights. 
This projection of judicial review into a new position of eminence 
and acceptability has ignited Professor Cappelletti's interest. In this 
slender but meaty and instructive volume, he gives us the distillate 
of his wide and thorough scholarship in this area. 
It may be surprising that in a book of little more than a hundred 
pages of text an author would attempt the kind of synoptic survey 
of judicial review that Professor Cappelletti undertakes in this vol-
ume.1 Only a person with the author's intellectual resources could 
do this. Professor Cappelletti, who is a professor of law both at Stan-
ford University and at the University of Florence and also Director 
of the Institute of Comparative Law at the latter institution, has 
the linguistic facilities that have made him knowledgeable with re-
spect to the constitutional systeIIlS of a number of countries. This 
store of knowledge includes a perceptive understanding of the con-
stitutional system of the United States and the role of judicial review 
in the operation of that system. 
The function of judicial review in maintaining constitutional 
control and the institutional forIIlS and procedures by which review 
1. For an earlier treatment of judicial review in its comparative aspects, see the 
excellent, comprehensive article by Professor W.K. Geck of the Law Faculty of the 
University of the Saarland, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative Survey of 
Present Institutions and Practices, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 250 (1966). This article drew for 
some of its sources on the compendious survey entitled VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 
(CONSTITUTIONAL REvmw IN THE WoRLD TODAY) (Carl Heymanns Verlag K.G., Koln• 
Berlin 1962), published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign 
Public Law and International Law of Heidelberg and based on the national reports 
submitted to the Colloquium held on this subject at the Institute in 1961. See Pro• 
fessor Geek's review of this very useful and important volume in 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 
644 (1964). See also E. MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW (4th ed. 1969), which is a com-
parative treatment of the subject but is concerned principally with English-speaking 
countries. 
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is made effective furnish the focus of Professor Cappelletti's interest. 
His basic approach is well stated in the closing paragraph of his 
preface: 
Constitutions express the "positivization" of higher values; judi-
cial review is the method for rendering these values effective; and 
the comparative method is the instrument of the movement towards 
harmonization and of the search for internationally acceptable val-
ues. These three are essentially linked together and form an integral 
part of the new direction in modern jurisprudence. [P. x.] 
In the first chapter, the author recognizes that judicial review 
is only one method of attaining what he calls "constitutional justice." 
Some countries depend upon political control, whether through the 
normal operation of a constitutional system or by explicit devices 
for review of legislation through political organs, as a means of con-
stitutional control of laws. The review by the Constitutional Coun-
cil, which was created by the French Constitution of 1958, of a legis-
lative enactment or an international treaty is essentially a political 
control: the Council's assigned function and its behavior in exercis-
ing this function indicate that it does not function in a judicial ca-
pacity. Its control is one stage in the whole legislative process. In 
Italy, political control over constitutionality is exercised by the Pres-
ident although judicial control is also exercised by the Italian Con-
stitutional Court. In the Soviet Union, the function of reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws and decrees is vested entirely in the major 
policy-determining organs that enact these measures. 
Just as the possibilities and means of political control over state 
action are varied, so the possibility of judicial control is varied too. 
In countries where the courts do not presume to pass on the validity 
of legislation, they may achieve a form of control of constitutionality 
by interpreting statutes; by subjecting administrative acts to careful 
control; and by providing a special form of relief such as habeas cor-
pus in England, the juicio de amparo in Mexico, and the constitu-
tional complaint in Switzerland, Austria, and Germany for individ-
uals who ·wish to complain of violation of "fundamental rights." 
One instance of such control is the Conseil d'Etat in France. This 
body has emerged as a court of constitutional review, at least with 
respect to all administrative actions, and employs rather broad norms 
to pass upon the validity of these actions. 
Asking why some countries such as France and Soviet Russia 
have repudiated judicial control of constitutionality, the author 
points out that in the case of France this policy is a continuation 
of a long tradition based on a strict conception of separation of 
powers and an aversion to the exercise of any kind of authority by 
the courts that might seem to be legislative in character. In Russia, 
by contrast, the absence of judicial review stems from a complete 
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rejection of the separation of powers principle and a commitment 
to a philosophy of government that places the entire control of the 
state in the political organs. 
In reviewing the historical antecedents of judicial review, par-
ticularly the stream of thinking that eventually found expression 
in the American conception of the Constitution as fundamental law 
and the authoritative role of the judiciary in interpreting that law, 
the author traces the evolution of the higher law concept from its 
roots in classical antiquity, through its formulation as "natural law" 
in medieval thinking, and as "the fundamental laws of the realm" 
asserted by French Parlements of the ancien regime as against the 
French sovereign, to the equating of the common law with funda-
mental law in the English judicial tradition. Although in the end 
parliamentary supremacy prevailed in England, the tradition of a 
body of principles superior even to statutory law and a profound 
regard for the judiciary and its independence, together with the ex-
perience during colonial days when judges disregarded local legisla-
tion not in conformity ·with the English law, contributed mightily 
to the formulation of constitutional ideas that eventually led to a 
doctrine of judicial review which found its classic expression in Chief 
Justice Marshall's opinion in Ma;rbury v. Madison.2 The author con-
cludes then that judicial review is the result of an evolutionary pat-
tern common to much of the West, in both civil- and common-law 
countries. 
In concluding his review of historical antecedents, Professor Cap-
pelletti notes that our own times have seen the burgeoning of "con-
stitutional justice," which combines the form of legal justice and 
the substance of natural justice, and that many modern states have 
asserted higher law principles through ·written constitutions, thus 
achieving a synthesis of three separate concepts: "the supremacy of 
certain higher principles, the need to put even the higher law in 
written form, and the employment of the judiciary as a tool for 
enforcing the constitution against ordinary legislation" (p. 42). Al-
though this union of concepts first occurred in the United States, 
many now regard it as essential to the rule of law. 
In the last three chapters, the author draws upon his intimate 
knowledge of contemporary developments to speak about modern 
systems of judicial review. He deals successively with the organs of 
judicial control, the process of control, and the effects of control. 
These chapters constitute probably the most instructive and illu-
minating parts of his book. In discussing the organs of control, he 
uses the term "centralized review" to refer to the system whereby 
special courts are set up-as in Austria, West Germany, Italy, Cy-
prus, and Yugoslavia-for the purpose of passing on constitutional 
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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questions. Even though incidental or decentralized review by the 
regular courts in the ordinary course of litigation is not completely 
excluded in these systems, the emphasis is upon the unique function 
of the constitutional court. In contrast, the American pattern of ju-
dicial review followed in a number of other systems relies on "de-
centralized review" in the sense that ordinary courts have authority 
to deal with constitutional questions as a necessary incident to their 
power to decide concrete cases and controversies. The author suc-
cinctly and interestingly discusses the rationale behind the two dif-
ferent types of review. Decentralized review is the natural and in-
evitable product of the reasoning employed by Marshall in Marbury 
to justify a court's duty and authority to disregard statutory enact-
ments found to be in conflict with the higher law embodied in the 
Constitution. Even though this system of review theoretically is 
limited to holding that a statute found unconstitutional is not rele-
vant to the disposition of the case before the court and is therefore 
binding only on the parties to the case, the practical effect of such 
a decision when combined with the doctrine of stare decisis is to 
make the statute unenforceable generally. In a system of centralized 
review, the whole focus is on the statute and the effect of finding 
the statute invalid is to annul it completely. 
Turning to the question why some civil-law countries have 
adopted a system of centralized judicial review as the primary means 
of constitutional control, the author points out that this kind of 
review rests on a totally different doctrine of separation of powers 
from that upon which decentralized review is founded. The act of 
reviewing legislation is viewed as a political rather than an ordinary 
judicial function: a tribunal created to discharge this function 
should be distinguished from an ordinary court. The manner pre-
scribed by the various constitutions for appointment of the members 
of these special constitutional courts and the responsibility of such 
courts to decide questions that American courts would usually shy 
away from as "political questions" emphasize the recognition of the 
political character of this type of judicial review. Moreover, the 
centralized system, with its emphasis on the examination of the 
statute and its power to annul the statute, reflects the absence of 
the principle of stare decisis in civil-law jurisdictions and also re-
flects the unsuitability of traditional civil-law courts for judicial 
review. In this connection, the author makes the point that judges 
trained in the civil service to deal primarily with questions of pri-
vate law do not adapt well to the function of passing on constitu-
tional questions. 3 
3. [T]he bulk of Europe's judiciary seems psychologically incapable of the value-
oriented, quasi-political functions involved in judicial review. It should be borne 
in mind that continental judges usually are "career judges," who enter the judi• 
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The distinction between centralized and decentralized review 
is reflected not only in the kind of organ used as the vehicle for 
judicial review but also in the processes employed by the tribunal. 
Again decentralized review, centering on the jurisdiction of ordinary 
courts to deal with constitutional questions as incident to the dispo-
sition of a concrete case, gives a pre-eminent place to private parties 
as the initiators of constitutional issues. Who is a proper party in 
interest to raise the issue and whether a given proceeding before 
the court is a genuine case or controversy are questions that play a sig-
nificant role in constitutional litigation in decentralized systems. 
The system of centralized review, on the other hand, since it views 
the constitutional court as essentially a quasi-political body, gives a 
much more prominent role to public organs as the appropriate par-
ties for raising constitutional issues. Indeed, some types of proceed-
ings authorized by constitution or statute to be brought before spe-
cial constitutional courts would strike the American lawyer or judge 
as the equivalent of advisory opinion proceedings. 
In the final chapter, the author discusses the effects of control 
and the differences again arising from the theory of centralized con-
trol on the one hand and what he calls decentralized control on the 
other. Under the centralized control theory, the court's decision upon 
finding a statute unconstitutional has the same effect as a legislative 
repeal of the statute. It is a decision directed against the statute 
itself, whereas under the theory of decentralized or incidental re-
view the court's decision concerns only the parties before the court 
and technically does not affect the statute except to make it unenforce-
able, although as a result of the doctrine of stare decisis it may well 
have the effect of making the statute a dead letter. The two types 
of review also point to possibly different results on the question of 
the effect of a decision in terms of its retroactivity. Since a special 
constitutional court's annulment of a statute is in substance a super-
legislative act, it operates like the repeal of a statute to deny it any 
future effect. On the other hand, the finding in a decentralized ju-
dicial review process that a statute is unenforceable theoretically 
denies the validity of the statute from its inception, although in 
practice courts have substantially limited the retroactive conse-
quences of such a decision. Indeed, in recent years, the United States 
ciary at a very early age and are promoted to the higher courts largely on the 
basis of seniority. Their professional training develops skills in technical rather 
than policy-oriented application of statutes. The exercise of judicial review, how-
ever, is rather different from the usual judicial function of applying the law. 
Modern constitutions do not limit themselves to a fixed definition of what the 
law is, but contain broad programs for future action. Therefore the task of ful-
filling the constitution often demands a higher sense of discretion than the task 
of interpreting ordinary statutes; that is certainly one reason why Kelsen, Cala-
mandrei, and others have considered it to be a legislative rather than a purely 
judicial activity. [Pp. 62-63.] 
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Supreme Court has limited the retroactive consequences of decisions 
that announced new interpretations of the Constitution, particularly 
when their effect was to overrule prior decisions. 
It is evident that each of the two systems of review has its advan-
tages and disadvantages: Professor Cappelletti makes no attempt to 
make out a case for one or the other, although it is evident that he 
admires the American system of review and the contribution it has 
made to constitutionalism. It may well be too that the differences 
bet1veen the two systems of review are not really as great as they 
appear on paper and that forces are at work manifesting some con-
vergence, both in basic conceptions and in the processes employed. 
These forces are particularly evident in the United States. Judging 
by the kinds of cases it elects to review, the United States Supreme 
Court regards itself in increasing measure as a central court of con-
stitutional review. To suggest that the disposition of constitutional 
issues is simply incident to the determination of cases turning prin-
cipally on other questions is something of a fiction, since a major 
part of litigation is instituted for the very purpose of raising consti-
tutional issues. Moreover, the dilution of the case or controversy 
limitations by the common use of declaratory proceedings and, even 
more remarkably, by the wholesale erosion now taking place in the 
party-in-interest concept, by the free use of class suits, and by the 
relatively easy invocation of federal judicial authority to test the 
constitutionality not only of statutes and regulations but of threat-
ened or prospective action suggest that the courts, with the blessing 
of the Supreme Court, are very hospitable to litigation directed 
wholly to constitutional ends and are ready to remove or bypass 
obstacles once thought to be associated with the decentralized or in-
cidental type of review. 
We are indebted to Professor Cappelletti for this highly illu-
minating and perceptive portrayal of judicial review in its contem-
porary aspects. A distinctive value of this book is that it reveals the 
many-faceted aspect of judicial review and the organs and processes 
for its implementation. An accurate appraisal of distinctions and 
differences is the beginning of wisdom in the use of terms and the 
evaluation of the institutions under review. Any comparative study 
is useful if for no other reason than that it forces critical analysis 
of accepted institutions and the procedures and assumptions under-
lying them. It may also suggest points of unity and convergence that 
promise a harmonization with mutually beneficial consequences. 
Professor Cappelletti's book is immensely useful in both respects. 
It is good that the publishers have issued the book in a less expensive 
student edition. This is a volume heartily recommended for teacher 
and students alike. While indispensable to those engaged in com-
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parative study, it is the kind of book which if not prescribed should 
· at least be highly recommended in any course in constitutional law. 
Paul G. Kauper, 
Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
